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“If the shoe ain’t your size, it ain’t gonna fit”: 
Ideologies of Professional and Marital Instability 
among US White-Collar Workers 
Carrie M. Lane 
Most scholars in the humanities and social sciences are comfortable, or at least 
familiar, with a certain degree of uncertainty in their work. Our subject matter 
rarely lends itself to tidy, verifiable conclusions; instead, particularly in the wake 
of postmodern critiques, our scholarly works almost always include a nod to the 
unknown, the yet to be studied, the likelihood that the passage of time will bring 
complication, revision, and, occasionally, retraction. This is perhaps doubly true 
for ethnographers, whose scholarship is based on participant-observation, open-
ended interviews, and the analysis thereof, and lies somewhere along the blurry 
border between the humanities and social sciences. As Clifford Geertz has said: 
It is a strange science whose most telling assertions are its most 
tremulously based, in which to get somewhere with the matter 
at hand is to intensify the suspicion, both your own and that of 
others, that you are not quite getting it right. But that, along with 
plaguing subtle people with obtuse questions, is what being an 
ethnographer is like. (29) 
We ethnographers are perhaps more comfortable than most with this reality. It is, to 
put it simply, the nature of human beings to lead messy, complicated, ever-changing 
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lives, and to talk and think about those lives in messy, complicated, ever-changing 
ways. Those of us who study human culture learn to accept, however begrudgingly, 
the inherently partial, mutable, and debatable nature of our findings, despite what 
tangible steps we might take to minimize those aspects of our work.1 Yet accepting 
on a philosophical level what George Marcus has called “a norm of incompleteness” 
(356) is a quite different thing from witnessing, as I recently did, the havoc such 
realities can wreak on one’s efforts to make the sort of claims and conclusions on 
which scholarly reputations and careers are built. 
Ultimately, this article has two arguments. In crafting the first, I draw on ex-
tended ethnographic fieldwork to document and explore connections between how 
unemployed white-collar high-tech workers in the first decade of the twenty-first 
century made sense of their increasingly insecure careers and how they made sense 
of their increasingly strained marriages. Complicating received wisdom about the 
inevitable “crisis of masculinity” that accompanies job loss, I demonstrate that 
many white-collar jobseekers saw themselves not as dependent employees vic-
timized by economic and political trends beyond their control, but as masculine, 
independent entrepreneurs navigating an increasingly competitive but ultimately 
fair labor market. This perspective represents a significant break from how previous 
generations of white-collar workers understood their work and the loss thereof, 
and demonstrates the need for new scholarly frameworks for thinking about both 
the structure and cultural meaning of work and unemployment. This worldview 
also had dramatic personal and political implications for tech workers. Although 
framing unemployment as natural and inevitable eases some of the psychological 
burdens of unemployment, it also erases corporate employers’ and pro-corporate 
government policies’ roles in dismantling the social contract of employment. As 
well, the valorization of the flexible, autonomous entrepreneur obscures the reality 
that most tech workers survived periodic bouts of unemployment not through their 
wits and wiles alone, but by relying on the financial support of employed spouses, a 
situation made possible by the national rise in dual-career couples and palatable by 
shifting cultural ideals of masculinity and marriage. Once again, however, framing 
reliance on a working spouse as natural mitigates certain hardships traditionally 
associated with unemployment, particularly for men, but implicitly sanctions the 
transfer of responsibility for managing insecure employment away from the cor-
poration or the state onto individual families, many of which, as I demonstrate, 
eventually falter and fail under that increasingly heavy burden. 
In the course of presenting my research findings, I also describe my experience 
of having to revisit and revise my previous (and published) conclusions in light 
of a series of follow-up interviews I conducted long after my initial fieldwork. 
Although this process ultimately strengthened and deepened my analysis, it also 
caused more than a little stress and self-doubt, particularly as it revealed certain 
weaknesses in my original research design. My second argument, then, is that 
experiences like mine of “not quite getting it right” can illuminate the unique chal-
lenges of ethnographic fieldwork while also demonstrating, in tangible, accessible 
ways, the inherently partial and incomplete nature of all cultural analysis. Openly 
discussing such experiences, while humbling, can serve to both instruct and reas-
       	
              
  
 
            
             
           
         
            
         
           
           
        
              
         
            
          
          
            
            
           
           
 Lane 39 
sure ethnographers, particularly the neophytes among us, by reminding us that we, 
like our scholarship, are fallible, mutable, and often surprisingly resilient in the 
face of challenges and change. 
In the summer of 2009, I was putting the finishing touches on a book manuscript 
about U.S. high-tech workers who lost their jobs during the economic downturn 
of the early 2000s. In that book, A Company of One (forthcoming), I investigate 
how these workers experience and make sense of the work they do and the loss 
thereof. I decided to open my conclusion with a “where are they now?” update 
on nine interviewees whose stories figured prominently in the preceding chapters. 
My original fieldwork was conducted between 2001 and 2004 in Dallas, Texas, 
and included open-ended interviews with 75 jobseekers, some of whom I met with 
multiple times over a four-year period. I had stayed in touch by e-mail with a few 
participants over the years, but it had been about five years since I had spoken with 
most, and I was curious—and a bit nervous—to learn how they had fared, profes-
sionally and personally, in the intervening years. That the nation was in the throes 
of yet another economic downturn at the time heightened the project’s relevance, 
but also made it all the more likely that some of the tech workers I had met nearly 
a decade before might be facing yet another bout with job loss and unemployment. 
One of the central findings of my research had been that today’s white-collar 
U.S. workers embrace a very different model of work and career than did previous 
generations. Since the dramatic expansion of the white-collar workforce in the late 
nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, the social contract of employment for 
middle-class, usually male, office workers was that, in exchange for hard work and 
loyalty, corporate employers would provide salaried employees with a middle-class 
standard of living, a paternalistic package of benefits (including such disparate ele-
ments as pensions, stock options, health care, pretty secretaries, and annual picnics), 
and, most importantly, secure, life-long employment (Davis; Kwolek-Folland). For 
much of the twentieth century, for the most part that contract held; while layoffs were 
routine, albeit usually temporary, for blue-collar workers, their white-collar counter-
parts enjoyed relative professional security. When that began to change in the 1970s, 
as companies adopted “lean and mean” management strategies that included regular 
downsizings, many white-collar workers felt misled and betrayed by the companies 
to which they had dedicated years, often decades, of loyalty and hard work. 
By the early 2000s, however, most white-collar tech workers held a very different 
set of expectations of their employers. As they explained it, job loss and periodic 
unemployment were not anomalous, unexpected events, but natural and inevitable 
components of modern professional life. These workers never expected to stay with 
a single employer for life; most had changed jobs many times already, voluntarily 
and involuntarily, and many had worked at various times as contractors, consultants, 
or entrepreneurs. As they saw it, a successful career was one to be culled together 
from a variety of positions, and their primary objective was not to stay employed, 
but to stay always employable, ready to change positions, and even professions, 
at a moment’s notice. Thus while they were by no means happy about being laid 
off, they rarely expressed the sense of shock, betrayal, and self-blame so prevalent 
among managers downsized in the 1980s, as described in Newman (42-94). These 
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twenty-first century tech workers, most of whom came of professional age after 
the social contract of employment had already been dismantled by frequent layoffs 
and the rise of contingent labor, believed that expecting an employer to provide 
secure, long-term employment these days was a fool’s errand. 
During the eighties, companies realized they don’t have any 
loyalty to their employees anymore. During the nineties, em-
ployees realized they don’t have any loyalty to their companies 
anymore… If a company has a need for my skills and I can supply 
that to them, they hire me. When that need is over with, when 
they don’t need me anymore, sure, I’m terminated. And I was 
just having, I’ll say a discussion but it was really an argument 
with good, good friends of ours over the weekend, and they’re 
still thinking in that old mode. And that old mode doesn’t exist 
anymore. They’re saying, “oh, but it’s so terrible to have people 
working at a company 20 years and then they lay them off.” Yeah, 
[obviously it is terrible]. What’s your point? I don’t know any 
company, where it’s in their charter, where it’s in their goal as a 
company, to provide employment to people. You know, it’s just 
not there. They’re in business to provide a service or a product. 
They’re not in business to hire people. (Phil Wright2, 47, consul-
tant to startup technology companies) 
Going out and looking for a job, it’s a sucker’s game. You’ll keep 
it as long as they want to let you have it. That’s easy to say. A lot 
of people are more than happy to go and do the nine-to-five gig 
and go home and not worry about it but they are liable to be a 
victim. They will be victimized because they allow themselves 
to be. (Mike Barnard, 49, digital media specialist) 
I think some employees sometimes complain that their career 
growth isn’t managed here [at his current, post-layoff employer]. 
That always annoys me because I feel like, you guys aren’t children. 
You need to manage your own careers. We can help you, but if 
you don’t take responsibility for your career growth then you’re 
hurting yourself. Why should a company have to do that for you? 
… People say, “Well, I gave the company ten years, blah, blah, 
blah, blah, blah.” Look, they paid you for those ten years, so I think 
you’re even, you know? (Daniel Klein, 28, software developer) 
In the quotations above, tech workers not only argue that the days of life-long 
employment at a single company are over, they lay claim to a particular form of 
masculine agency. Framing secure, long-term employment as a weak and dependent 
state, they manage, even while unemployed, to position themselves as progressive, 
independent agents. They invoke the foil of the organization man, whose loyalty 
and yen for security now mark him as an outmoded thinker, willing victim, or an-
noying child. Through the individualistic, pro-market discourse of neoliberalism 
(the origins and sway of which are described in Frank and Harvey), unemploy-
ment is transformed into a state of relative autonomy in which the jobseeker is 
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not a failed would-be dependent, but, in the tech workers’ own words, a flexible 
“company of one,” prepared to compete, and to win, on the idealized playing field 
of the free market. 
In my book, I argue that this perspective softened some of the potentially emas-
culating effects of job loss and prolonged unemployment for male jobseekers. By 
conceptualizing themselves as valued professionals despite the absence of paid 
employment (a perspective that, I argue, regular participation in organized network-
ing events for the unemployed not only encouraged but ritually reinforced), these 
workers sidestepped, at least to some degree, many of the emotional and social 
hardships traditionally associated with unemployment. Yet this model of work had 
other, less positive effects. First, this unrelentingly individualistic worldview ren-
dered essentially invisible the possibility of more public and collective responses 
to insecure employment and inadequate social provisions for the unemployed. As 
well, it obscured the extent to which these jobseekers’ material advantages, most 
of them unique to the educated middle and upper classes—including access to 
credit and well-paying, if not high status, interim positions—made possible the 
embracing of this more “flexible” approach to unemployment. 
Finally, and most relevant to the discussion at hand, this framing of jobseekers 
as self-reliant companies of one, in contrast to dependent employees, ignored that 
most tech workers in this study were in fact members of two-income households.3 
Thus their ability to weather prolonged unemployment, financially and emotionally, 
and to hold out for professional positions was in fact due more to their dependence 
(on a spouse’s income) than to their independence. Yet when they discussed their 
working spouses, to whom they were outspokenly grateful, male jobseekers drew on 
revamped models of masculinity and marital partnership to frame their reliance on 
a wife’s income as evidence of their manhood, rather than a challenge to it. When 
I spoke to 58-year-old Ed Donnelly in 2004, for instance, he had been looking for 
a computer programming position for nearly four years while working part-time 
at an electronics store. His wife, he said, “has gotten a pretty decent job, so she is 
basically the breadwinner in the family and I am struggling to pay my share of the 
expenses. And unlike a lot of guys I don’t have a problem with me having the lower 
income.” Conceptualizing his willingness to rely on his wife’s income as evidence 
of his non-sexist views, Ed implicitly contrasts himself to those less secure or less 
progressive men who might be intimidated by such a situation. 
Other male jobseekers explained their reliance on spousal income as the natural 
product of the ever-shifting division of labor within marriages based on egalitarian 
partnerships.4 While he looked for full-time work in high tech, Enrique Vivar, a 
35-year old project manager, had taken on two part-time jobs (unloading trucks at a 
furniture warehouse and teaching Spanish at night school); his wife, a homemaker 
since their first child’s birth five years before, had also taken on two part-time 
positions, and the two now shared responsibility for childcare and domestic work. 
Of their marriage, Enrique said, “It’s not a marriage for convenience, you know, 
where I’m going to provide and she’s going to care for the kids. It’s a marriage for 
love.” Enrique explicitly rejects the model of the provider husband and dependent 
wife, drawing on the discourse of romantic love, rather than material exchange, to 
  
              
           
           
           
            
               
          
 
             
           
        
            
            
        
           
           
         
            
          
           
         
 
42 IJCS 
recast theirs as a natural, even morally superior division of responsibilities.
Many married male jobseekers shared Enrique’s conviction that the division of 
labor within modern marriages need not fall along traditional gender lines. Since 
his layoff from a once-hot web design firm, Alex Brodsky, 40, had taken on respon-
sibility for “doing laundry, running whatever errands needed to be done, paying 
the bills, taking care of all the domestic things that go into keeping a household 
running. Because I was the only one available and that was a job that I was able 
to do.” Meanwhile, his family, which included Alex, his wife, and their young 
daughter, was living off his wife’s salary as a high school teacher. 
This isn’t my first time being unemployed. …And again that’s put 
a big burden on [my wife]. She supported me through that. That’s 
the key to it. She has taken on incredible burdens to help me to 
do the things that I need to do. Not to her complete detriment to 
the point that she completely loses [her] identity, but knowing 
that we’re both working towards something. I’m doing my part, 
she’s doing her part. (Alex Brodsky, 40, Information Architect) 
Like Enrique’s,Alex’s framing of the division of financial and other responsibilities 
within his marriage rejects the model of provider and dependent. Although his wife 
earns most of the family’s income,Alex does not see himself as a dependent, with all 
the emasculating implications such positioning might incur. Instead, he sees himself 
contributing in equal if unpaid ways, a statement that reflects the extent to which 
U.S. ideals of manhood and fatherhood have altered over the previous thirty years.
Ed, Enrique, andAlex all draw on narratives of successful manhood that are them-
selves the relatively recent products of decades-long cultural and social shifts around 
feminism, family, and masculinity—the enlightened husband comfortable with his 
wife’s professional success; the romantic who wants a partner, not a Stepford wife; 
the doting father who willingly shoulders the second shift of domestic and childcare 
responsibilities. These images complicate the long-standing presumption that U.S. 
men’s identities are grounded entirely in paid labor and financial provision, and 
support Nicholas Townsend’s argument that U.S. men actually make sense of their 
lives through a “package deal” of interconnected elements, including fatherhood, 
marriage, employment, and home ownership. In and of itself, this represents a radi-
cal departure from the experiences of previous generations of displaced white-collar 
American men, whose identities were tethered so tightly to secure paid employment. 
Based on these findings, in 2009 I published a research article in which I argued 
that changing norms of middle-class masculinity, shifting structures of white-collar 
employment, and the rise of dual-earner families had combined in such a way 
that jobless men were now able to retain a sense of themselves as independent, 
masculine professionals despite increasingly long periods of unemployment, un-
deremployment, and reliance on spousal income. I also noted, however, that these 
changes had occurred alongside, and, in some ways, facilitated, the transfer of 
responsibility for managing the increasingly heavy burdens of insecure employ-
ment and a social safety net weakened by neoliberal policies onto the shoulders 
of dual-income families. 
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It was only shortly after I sent that article to press that I reconnected with my 
primary informants for follow-up interviews. My central objectives were to discover 
whether they had retained their faith in the ideology of career management over time, 
and to determine how well that belief system had served them, professionally speak-
ing. On the former question, the response was essentially unanimous; on the latter, it 
was decidedly less so. Five years out, nearly every jobseeker maintained a dogmatic 
faith that managing one’s career, eschewing long-term employment at a single firm, 
and remaining always on the lookout for the next job was the best, indeed only, way 
to achieve professional success. Even those who had not been particularly successful 
on the labor market remained nonetheless committed to the notion that professional 
and financial rewards awaited those who navigated the job market as self-reliant, 
optimistic companies of one. With very few exceptions, they were firmly against 
organized political action on behalf of the unemployed (this was true even among 
those who were themselves again unemployed in 2009), and saw the individual as 
ultimately responsible for his or her professional fate, even during the worst recession 
in decades. When they did articulate frustration with the worsening economy, weak 
labor market, and lack of adequate support for unemployed persons, interviewees 
either opined that there was nothing they or other Americans could do to alter the 
situation, or espoused wholly individualistic solutions, such as remaining positive, 
networking, scaling back household expenses, or helping others. 
The consistency of tech workers’ responses over time reinforced my initial as-
sessment of how central the ideology of career management is to their perspectives 
on work and unemployment. It also answered, at least in part, a lingering question 
about the resiliency of that worldview. Upon reading the dissertation upon which 
my book is loosely based, one of my advisors asked me what I thought the “shelf 
life” of this optimistic, individualistic perspective on job loss would be. He sus-
pected, and others have since echoed him in this, that the passage of time, and the 
continuing scarcity of full-time professional work, would erode jobseekers’ faith in 
the promise of a self-managed career. Were I to stay in the field a few more years, it 
was suggested, I would witness the unraveling of this system of beliefs and the rise 
of a more critical and politically charged perspective on corporate employers and 
the demise of job security. Certainly, there are Americans who have embraced just 
such a position as their time out of work wears on, their savings dwindle, and the 
gaps in their resumes grow ever more glaring. Yet, as others have acutely noted and 
usually lamented (e.g., Ehrenreich; Greenhouse; Venkatesh), American labor has 
an incredibly long fuse; these high-tech workers, steeped as they are in a broader 
culture of antipolitics that “dismisses as futile both the discourse of critique and 
the call for social transformation” (Giroux 2), are no exception. 
This finding is particularly noteworthy in light of how varied these nine job-
seekers’ professional fortunes had been over the preceding five years. Three of the 
tech workers I interviewed are reemployed at salaries higher than their pre-layoff 
positions; three are reemployed in full-time professional positions (one as an en-
trepreneur) but at a fraction of their previous income; one had moved through two 
managerial positions since we last spoke but was now unemployed again following 
another layoff; one never found another professional position and works a sales job 
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for an hourly wage of $9; and one (the only woman among the nine) left a new, 
well-paid professional position to become a full-time mother but is now pursuing 
contract positions to supplement her husband’s income. Career managers were not 
wrong that the modern career is characterized by volatility; between them, from 
2004 to 2009 the nine experienced four layoffs and more than a dozen job changes, 
not counting short contract positions. The resilience of their worldview, despite the 
financial and professional insecurity they have endured demonstrates that, while 
even former proponents such as Alan Greenspan agree that the neoliberal climate 
that engendered and sustained career management appears to be on its last legs, its 
ideological sway among white-collar Americans remains strong. 
That consistency, as frustrating as it might be to those looking to unemployed 
workers to serve as the vanguard of social change, shored up my original find-
ings, including my sense that, for its adherents, career management was never 
just a situationally convenient way of thinking; instead, it reflected and reinforced 
a much deeper and longstanding set of beliefs about the world and their place in 
it. Another pattern that emerged in my follow-up interviews, however, challenged 
some of my initial conclusions. Of the tech workers I re-interviewed (all of whom 
were heterosexual), seven had been part of a dual-earner household at the time of 
their job loss (two were married to each other), and two, both men, had wives who 
were full-time homemakers before their job loss but subsequently took part-time 
jobs while their husbands looked for work. By 2009, three of those eight marriages 
had ended or were, according to my interviewees, in the process of ending. Statis-
tically, this is not necessarily significant. Nearly half of all marriages in the U.S. 
end in divorce. That more than a third of these marriages failed within the same 
five-year period, however, certainly seems significant. Even so, it was not so much 
that these marriages were ending, but the way in which interviewees discussed the 
demise of their marriages that most piqued my interest. 
Those tech workers whose marriages were still intact continued to refer to theirs 
as egalitarian partnerships to which each spouse contributed in his or her own way. 
The three men whose salaries and statuses had improved over the previous five 
years expressed great appreciation for their wives’ support during their time out 
of work. Two men’s wives continued to work, while a third had retired from her 
executive position and was now supplementing her husband’s income with her 
pension. Two of the men who had found full-time professional positions but taken 
significant pay cuts since their layoff remained married, but had altered the division 
of responsibilities within their marriages. The first, Daniel Klein, whose comments 
on his “childish” coworkers I quoted earlier, met his wife Natalie when they were 
both employed at a dotcom consulting firm. Following their layoffs (he was laid 
off approximately a year before she was) he found work quickly, but she struggled 
for nearly a year before finding reemployment. A year into her new job, which was 
both well paid and professionally rewarding, Natalie quit after giving birth to the 
couple’s first child. Not only did they now have a child to support (and have since 
had another), but the couple went from having “a ton of disposable income” to 
living on Daniel’s salary alone, a situation that became particularly challenging 
during the two months he spent out of work following yet another layoff in 2006. 
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Despite Daniel’s new role as sole breadwinner, the couple continued to concep-
tualize theirs as a partnership of equal contributors. Natalie explained: 
I don’t think there was ever a thought that [raising a child] was 
going to be easier [than paid employment], but it is so much 
harder! [Laughs] Holy cow! Physically and mentally, it’s so much 
harder,And I think that took away so much of my concern or guilt 
or whatever about not earning physical cash, because there’s no 
question about contributing to the family. It’s just contributing 
in a very different way. 
Daniel shared this perspective, emphasizing that Natalie’s work in the home, while 
unpaid, was a job nonetheless. 
She has her job, I have mine, meaning her job is to take care of 
the kids, while I go to my job, which is over there. There are 
definitely guys out there who are just like, she’s spending your 
money, and blah, blah, blah. I just think that that’s not a very 
healthy partnership. 
By framing Natalie’s domestic and childcare work as labor, albeit unpaid, that is 
akin to what Daniel does at the office, the couple retained a sense of their marriage 
as a partnership of equals even as they adopted a more traditional gendered division 
of familial responsibilities. 
Another jobseeker, Keith Hartmann, experienced a similar, although steeper, 
decline in pay and status following his layoff. Following a job search that lasted 
nearly two years, Keith took a job overseas that, while extremely lucrative, meant 
living apart from his wife and three children. After one year, he left that position 
for a job in Texas that allowed him to return to his family, but was laid off almost 
immediately due to budget cuts. He spent the next eight months looking for work 
before landing a full-time job at a salary just a third of what he had been paid over-
seas. While Keith was unemployed, his wife, who had been a full-time homemaker 
for more than twenty years, took a part-time job in their children’s school cafeteria 
to help pay the bills. She continued working even after he landed his new job in 
order to help make up for his lost salary. It was, Keith said, a difficult transition for 
her, but her willingness to take on that job, along with their children’s unyielding 
support, are what Keith emphasized most when discussing his time out of work: 
What I remember the most is how my family bonded together, and 
how we relied on each other, and not material things. … Those 
are the kind of things that I will remember during that period, 
the good things that taught us character and persistence and not 
so much the financial stress. 
Reframing the story of his unemployment and downward mobility into a narrative 
demonstrating the triumph of character over adversity, Keith manages to transform 
an externally imposed hardship into an opportunity to demonstrate his family’s 
closeness and mutual support. His family’s transition from one to two earners is 
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celebrated as a demonstration of mutual support and commitment, rather than a 
necessary and sometimes painful response to circumstances beyond their control. 
That the partnership ideal lives on in couples whose financial security has im-
proved over the past five years is not surprising. That Keith’s and Daniel’s families 
retain that ideal despite multiple job losses and dramatic drops in household income 
testifies more powerfully to the model’s ability to persist in challenging circum-
stances. The experiences of other jobseekers, however, those who fared similar to 
or worse than these men on the labor market, reveal the limits of that resilience in 
significant and disquieting ways, and point to aspects of the connection between 
how career managers think about work and how they think about their most intimate 
relationships that I had not fully explored in my previous analyses. 
Mike Barnard, quoted earlier saying that looking for a job is “a sucker’s game,” 
was frustrated to find himself playing that game again and again following his 
layoff. After his division at a large media company was disbanded in 2001, Mike, 
then nearing 50, found full-time work as a contractor at another large corporation. 
Every time the company’s quarterly earnings dipped below expectations, however, 
Mike and his fellow contractors were laid off, and then rehired weeks later after 
the company had “made their numbers.” Mike quickly tired of being one of “the 
fall guys whenever there was a downturn.” He had always wanted to start his own 
company, and decided that this was the ideal time to do it. His then-wife, who 
worked full-time, disagreed. Mike said: 
I told my wife I was pretty sick of that and didn’t see much of 
a future in it, and she was really insistent that I remained em-
ployed, as she saw it. It was probably one of the big issues, one 
of the tiebreakers on our marriage insofar in that I really was not 
wanting to go and continue to be a corporate whore, so to speak. 
In describing his situation as that of a “corporate whore,” Mike echoed previous 
characterizations of corporate employment as a feminized state of dependence. As 
he saw it, pursuing an entrepreneurial venture could serve as one means of reassert-
ing his masculinity and independence in the face of a frustrating and disempowering 
situation. His wife, however, did not share his perspective on corporate employment, 
which she saw as the (relatively) secure alternative to entrepreneurship’s risks. Yet in 
encouraging Mike to remain a corporate employee she denied him the one way he saw 
to reclaim his masculine agency. Ultimately, Mike chose to start his own company 
anyway (it is now in its fifth year and doing quite well), and the couple divorced. 
Mike’s was not the only marriage to become a casualty of insecure employment. 
The last time we spoke in 2004, Ed Donnelly, the programmer who “unlike a lot 
of guys” did not have a problem earning less than his wife, had been looking for a 
new programming job for nearly four years while relying on his wife’s salary and 
working part-time at a big-box electronics store. He stayed at the electronics store 
far longer than he expected; when he ultimately left, it was not, as he had envisioned, 
for a new job in high-tech but for another sales job, this one at a gardening store 
(gardening was a long-time hobby of Ed’s) where a better schedule, friendlier boss, 
and more satisfying work environment compensated for the lower hourly wage. 
       	
 
           
            
 Lane 47 
When we reconnected in 2009, one of the first things Ed, then 62, told me was that 
his marriage was in the process of ending. In an initial email, he wrote: 
I will go on to say, not as an appeal for sympathy but only as a 
data point for your book, that I am currently separated from my 
wife and do not expect a reconciliation. I don’t think that my not 
having a good job was the only factor, but I do believe it was the 
most significant one. Ah, well, life goes on. 
When we later spoke, Ed again drew a clear connection between the demise of his 
career and the demise of his marriage: “Because I’m not employed as well as I was 
and she is once again well employed, I don’t feel like I’m contributing as much as I 
could be to the marriage. She said that she didn’t worry about that, but her attitude 
seemed to say otherwise.” Ed’s own thoughts about his joblessness further fueled 
their difficulties. He said he was no longer as self-confident as he once was, and 
had lost hope of ever returning to the programming work he loves. He still saw 
marriage as a partnership to which one can contribute in meaningful ways even 
when unemployed, but, “If you can’t contribute financially,” he said, “you have 
an obligation to contribute other ways, and I couldn’t keep up.” 
Though he sometimes got angry, both about his impending divorce and his in-
ability to find professional reemployment, Ed, who was in 2009 “hanging on teeth 
and toenails, paying expenses and trying not to dig into my savings to do that,” 
framed both hardships as the result of personal choices, rather than corporate deci-
sions beyond his control. 
Something goes wrong, you get angry. You don’t have to have 
a rational reason for it. … Intellectually, I know that I got paid 
well for what I was doing and it’s my own fault that I didn’t 
leave myself an out. The fact that my job skills are out of date is 
unfortunate from my perspective, but I consider it my own fault 
that I didn’t see it coming and stay current so that I could jump 
to another job where I would have the current knowledge to keep 
working. That’s my fault, not anybody else’s. 
Holding tightly to the individualist tenets of career management, Ed saw his career, 
like his marriage, as a casualty of his own failings, a perspective that, while hardly 
cheery, at least manages to recapture some sense of individual agency amidst a sea 
of insecurity and helplessness.5 
Enrique Vivar, who declared his a marriage of love, not convenience, drew 
different but equally revealing parallels between the professional and personal 
hardships he had experienced over the previous five years. After more than a year 
of searching in the early 2000s, Enrique landed a position as a project manager 
approximately a year before I left the field. His wife then quit her part-time jobs to 
return to the role of full-time homemaker. Over the next few years, Enrique volun-
tarily changed jobs twice more, both times transitioning into higher paid positions 
that allowed him to work in his chosen field of international project management. 
In early 2009, however, Enrique lost his job due to budget constrictions and ongo-
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ing conflicts with his managers.
	
I could see the handwriting on the wall … and I was scared, 
scared to the bones that I was going to get laid off. I didn’t want 
it to happen because I knew that I had been laid off before and I 
was 14 months without a job and all that stuff, and I knew that 
the economy wasn’t at its best right now, so I didn’t want it to 
happen. I managed to hold onto my job for about eight months, 
but ultimately, if the shoe ain’t your size, it ain’t gonna fit. 
Though his most recent layoff was clearly against his will, Enrique employed the 
metaphor of “fit” to reposition himself and his employers as equals, both seeking 
an ideal match. Had they been more compatible, Enrique suggested, he would 
still be employed, a claim that contradicts his own stated belief that job security 
is no longer attainable for U.S. workers. Asserting that his layoff was the natural 
result of incompatibility, however contradictory, allowed Enrique to avoid the 
emasculating conceptualization of himself as a helpless victim of a broader trend, 
aptly documented by Uchitelle, toward treating all employees, even experienced 
managers, as ultimately disposable. 
This belief, that layoffs are both natural and a matter of individual, rather than 
structural, issues, is of course one of career management’s central tenets, and to 
hear Enrique invoke it when discussing his layoff was hardly surprising. What did 
catch me off guard, however, was when he used the exact same metaphor to discuss 
his marriage, which had deteriorated significantly in the years since we last spoke. 
After his most recent layoff, Enrique’s wife Anna started her own business as an 
event planner to bring in money while he looked for work. Enrique, in turn, took 
on the bulk of the labor involved with running the household and caring for two 
children. While he enjoyed and took pride in these activities, the shift from primary 
breadwinner to co-earner and then to dependent spouse had been difficult for him. 
I am really a proud Dad. I’ve got to tell you. I cook for everyone, 
I make sure that the house is clean for everyone. I take care of the 
cars, I take care of the finances. She takes care of her business, 
which, I have an MBA and just a couple of week ago I said, “You 
know, for the last year I’ve been doing your finances … and last 
year you still lost about 15 grand. She goes, “No we didn’t, if 
you consider the taxes and you paid my salary and everything.” 
I was like, “Wait a minute. I’ve got an MBA. You don’t know 
diddlysquat of how to run your business.” And I’m giving you 
the short story of course. And we just don’t know how to com-
municate with each other. 
Enrique was proud of the ways in which he contributed to his family, and he drew 
an explicit parallel between those things he took care of (the cooking, the house, 
the cars, and the children) and that which Anna took care of (her business). In this 
sense, he was asserting the same partnership ideal of marriage that he and other 
male jobseekers invoked years before, in which each member contributes in his or 
her own different but equally valuable way. Yet Enrique was clearly not entirely 
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comfortable with this division of responsibilities. After establishing his own busi-
ness credentials (“I have an MBA”), Enrique goes on to question the profitability 
of Anna’s business. When she rejects his assessment of her finances, and by as-
sociation the value of his MBA, Enrique bristles, restating his superior qualifica-
tions and directly challenging Anna’s ability to run a business. The problem, then, 
is not so much that the two “just don’t know how to communicate,” but that both 
are frustrated by their current situation and, more pointedly, that Anna refuses to 
accept Enrique’s assertion that he, not she, remains the family’s business expert 
despite the fact that her business income supports them all. 
The extent to which Enrique’s sense of self worth depends on Anna’s validation 
is further demonstrated by his complaints about her refusal to acknowledge his 
work in the home. 
I am a lot less stressed, Carrie, because Anna’s got an income 
and now it’s her turn to maintain us. And if she didn’t have that 
income I’d be walking on the streets now, I’d be trying to do 
whatever needed to be done to pay the mortgage. Whereas right 
now because she’s working I am taking care of the kids and I’m 
taking care of the house and I’m taking care of a lot of things, 
and I’m not dying. The only thing is where I tell my true friends, 
I don’t mind doing it, but I do mind not being acknowledged for 
it. [Laughs] Now I sound like the wife. See how it sounds like 
the wife? 
Enrique initially suggests that he is comfortable with, even relieved by, their current 
arrangement. He has done his part, and now it is Anna’s turn to maintain the family. 
Yet his concluding joke suggests that Enrique feels emasculated by his dependence 
on his wife, both for financial support and for her acknowledgment of the value of 
his contributions to the family. He nervously laughs at the idea that he is playing the 
role of wife, not so much in terms of the labor he performs, but in the humiliating 
predicament of having to seek out, and not receive, affirmation of the value of his work. 
Ultimately, though, Enrique reveals that it is not just Anna, but he, who doubts 
the value of his unpaid contributions. 
Now she is the sole breadwinner, or bread provider, and I con-
tribute what my measly workforce unemployment insurance will 
provide. [How do you feel about that?] I’ve been going back 
and forth. I’m okay with it. I just love being a lazy bum. I have 
become a lazy bum lately, just for the fact that it doesn’t matter 
how hard I’ve tried, I haven’t been able to make my wife and my 
family a hundred percent happy. And I shouldn’t say my family, 
I should say my wife in general. 
In the course of one interview, Enrique shifts from depicting theirs as a partnership 
of equal contributors, each taking care of different tasks, to one in which they “take 
turns” maintaining the family, and then, revealing his deepest fear, to one in which 
Anna is the breadwinner and he the lazy bum. Despite his proclamations of his 
domestic and business abilities, and his insistence that it is only fair that Anna now 
shoulder the burden of maintaining the family financially, here Enrique reveals the 
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extent to which he, and perhapsAnna too, holds tight to a more traditional yardstick 
of masculinity, one according to which his current efforts fall far short of success.
All three of the men described above were, in their own way, trying to shore up 
their wounded masculinity, whether through entrepreneurship, continued jobseek-
ing, or the embrace of domestic responsibilities, and all three believed their wives 
were undermining those efforts. Had Mike’s wife endorsed his business idea, had 
Ed not suspected his joblessness was actually a factor in his wife’s discontent, had 
Enrique felt that Anna appreciated his work in the home and shared his perception 
of theirs as an equal partnership, then these marriages, as these men see it, might 
have survived. That they did not is therefore framed as the result of personality 
conflicts and individual choices. Enrique made this particularly clear when at the 
end of our interview he said of his marriage: “I’ve tried, I’ve tried, I’ve tried. It’s 
just gotten to the point, I’ve stopped trying. It’s time, because if the shoe ain’t the 
right size, it ain’t gonna fit.” Employing the exact same metaphor to describe his 
looming divorce as he did when discussing his layoff, Enrique depicts as natural 
an event that is the product of specific economic circumstances and corporate busi-
ness decisions. His and other male jobseekers’continued reliance on the neoliberal, 
individualistic ideology of career management, which I initially interpreted as a 
relatively effective if not necessarily ideal means of managing professional and 
personal transitions, prevents these workers from acknowledging that their mar-
riages have been challenged and gradually weakened by the emotional and financial 
strain of multiple job losses, prolonged unemployment, financial hardship, and the 
demands of supporting a family.Attributing these difficulties to “fit” and personality 
renders invisible this alternative way of explaining, and attributing blame for, the 
unfortunate end of a marriage. 
That unemployment strains marriages is not news; it is an oft-proclaimed truism 
that money (along with sex and parenting) is the most common cause of marital 
conflict. Indeed, I included examples of such tensions in earlier publications on this 
project, but prior to conducting these follow-up interviews I had not recognized 
the complicity of career management in disguising the role that economic and 
political circumstances beyond jobseekers’ control had played in those conflicts. 
When I concluded that changing cultural norms around marriage and masculinity 
shielded married men’s egos and identities from some of the harsher aspects of job 
loss and unemployment—something I still believe—I failed to examine whether 
their wives shared these views, or to investigate further the instances I did see of 
marital tensions resulting from prolonged joblessness. 
My belated awareness of the extent to which tech workers’ marriages were 
strained by job loss and unemployment, and the ways in which jobseekers co-opted 
the language of career management to explain their marital problems, was hidden, at 
least to a degree, by flaws in my initial research design. My focus had been almost 
exclusively on the jobseekers themselves and their regular participation in a vast web 
of networking and job search events geared to unemployed professionals.Although I 
noted a few instances of marital strife in my original interviews—including an early 
argument between Enrique and his mother-in-law over his familial responsibili-
ties—that subject occupied a tangential space in my overall argument until an early 
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reader of my dissertation brought its larger significance to my attention. Familiar 
as I am with research on the intimate interconnections and permeable boundaries 
between work and home life for white-collar workers (including Hochschild 1989; 
2001; Nippert-Eng), I should have been more attuned to those connections and their 
significance, and should have interviewed more than the handful of spouses that 
I did. Ultimately, refocusing my attention on these issues led me to reverse some 
of my previous beliefs about the extent to which tech workers’ ideas about work 
were connected to their ideas about marriage. 
I was initially skeptical, for instance, of Richard Sennett’s argument that the new 
system of flexible work arrangements and frequent job change “corrodes trust, loyalty, 
and mutual commitment” (24). It was too much of a leap, I thought, to link changes in 
the structure of the modern workplace and career to an alleged difficulty maintaining 
more permanent relationships in other aspects of life, and yet my own data now attests 
to that connection. My initial failure to see that link was due in part to the striking 
dissimilarities I observed between contemporary tech workers and their 1980s coun-
terparts. The newer generation’s more sanguine, optimistic perspective was so distinct 
from what I had expected to find that it obscured some of the subtler ways in which 
modern managers resembled their predecessors. Thus my initial conclusions, while 
not entirely uncritical, emphasized career management’s role in sustaining jobseek-
ers’ optimism and self-esteem; it was only upon learning of jobseekers’ subsequent 
marital struggles that I began to reread male jobseekers’ initial descriptions of their 
successful, egalitarian marriages in more nuanced and critical ways.6 
That the ideology of career management obscures and even exacerbates the dam-
age insecure employment and prolonged joblessness have wrought on tech workers 
and their families is itself a significant finding. It testifies both to the resilience 
of neoliberalism’s individualist, pro-market modes of thought and to the ongoing 
hardships—personal, financial, and professional—facing jobless and insecurely 
employed U.S. workers and their families. It also demands that we rethink many of 
our assumptions about the structure and meaning of white-collar work, particularly 
in light of dramatic cultural shifts over the previous decades around what it means 
to be a valued professional, a successful man, and a good husband and father. Such 
considerations become even more important as we struggle to make sense of, and 
make predictions about, the experiences of the millions of U.S. workers whose 
jobs were lost in the most recent economic downturn. 
These specific findings, and the processes by which I reached them, have further 
implications for how we think about and go about doing ethnographic research. In 
addition to the flaws in research design I describe above, it is also simply the case 
that it took time for these marriages to falter under the combined weight of inse-
cure employment, economic hardship, and the unexpected renegotiation of gender 
roles and responsibilities. My more than three-year field stay was long by recent 
standards; the unofficial one- to two-year norm established early in the twentieth 
century (itself an “idealized, caricatured model” (Okely 357) has recently given 
way to shorter durations (Wolcott 69) and what Wulff calls “yo-yo fieldwork,” 
culled together from a series of brief site visits. While I am concerned about the 
general shrinking of fieldwork durations and swayed by arguments like those in 
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Kemper et al. as to the benefits of long-term research projects, I do not believe all 
projects require extended, unbroken field stays, or that long fieldwork durations 
inevitably result in superior scholarship. Indeed, no matter how long one stays 
in the field, ending a research project is akin to putting a novel down with a few 
chapters to go. One may have a sense of where things are going, but cannot say 
for certain how the story will end. And yet we all must eventually leave the field, 
even if only because our tenure and promotion schedules demand that we publish 
our conclusions in one form or another and move on to new projects. 
To return to my initial point, my experience tangibly illustrates the ways in which 
ethnographic research, whether three days’or three years’worth, is always incomplete, 
always in progress, always ripe for reconsideration. While my initial findings were 
not necessarily inaccurate, they were certainly partial. This ever-unfinished nature of 
cultural analysis can be frustrating and, at moments, discouraging. I have wondered 
more than once what more, what else, I might have learned with yet another bout of 
fieldwork. Specifically, what new features and fissures might be revealed through 
additional interviews and observation? Are there in fact temporal, emotional, or fi-
nancial limits across which these tech workers will not be pushed? If their emotional 
and financial reserves eventually do run dry, will their optimistic individualism then 
give way to collective rage? Or is this worldview so persistent and persuasive that 
individual Americans and their families will continue to stoically accept whatever 
burdens are piled upon them, even as their bank accounts dwindle, their job prospects 
grow bleaker, and their personal relationships grow increasingly strained? 
For those of us who make our living seeking to understand why people do the 
fascinating things they do, it can be discomfiting to leave such an array of questions 
unanswered, even if only for now. As useful as I believe it is to publicly discuss the 
processes by which we arrive at, refine, and occasionally discard our findings, it is 
difficult not to be at least slightly self-conscious when airing one’s intellectual and 
procedural dirty laundry. It can be tempting to hide those doubts behind a mask of 
positivist certainty or, conversely, to declare all efforts to document the workings of 
a particular culture doomed before they begin. But, to employ the metaphor Geertz 
uses when discussing objectivity, to do so would be “like saying that as a perfectly 
aseptic environment is impossible, one might as well conduct surgery in a sewer” 
(30). Alternatively, experiences like my own might be used to demonstrate the 
unique challenges of cultural analysis while also impelling us in more productive 
directions, prodding us to design our projects more thoughtfully, schedule our field 
visits more carefully, and couch our findings in language that recognizes, without 
surrendering to, the inherent imperfection of what it is that we as cultural analysts 
do. Our inevitable missteps and misgivings, rather than weakening or invalidating 
our conclusions, can instead be used to hone and strengthen them, resulting in 
works that more fully and accurately reflect the complicated, inconstant nature of 
the world around us and the lives being lived therein. 
Notes 
See for example Kemper et al. on the advantages of long-term longitudinal 
studies, a topic I return to later in this article. 
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2 “Phil Wright” is a pseudonym, as are the names of all interviewees quoted or 
discussed in this article. 
3 One survey found that just over half of laid-off tech workers in the greater Dallas 
area had a working spouse at the time of their job loss (Virick), which corresponds 
closely to the nation as a whole, in which more than half of all married couples 
include two full-time earners (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2). 
4 Unemployed women, in contrast, were far less comfortable relying on a spouse’s 
income, and tended to employ a language of guilt and self-blame more similar to 
that of laid-off managers of the 1980s than to their male contemporaries. Elsewhere 
(Lane forthcoming; Lane 2009) I attribute this in great part to professional women’s 
belated embracing of the managerial ideology of meritocratic individualism, which 
explains failure in exclusively individual rather than structural or political terms, 
at the very moment men were casting off that framework. 
5 For a fuller discussion of the compensatory benefits of claiming responsibility 
for one’s own downward mobility, see Newman 233. 
6 I owe Kathryn Dudley a significant debt for her role in helping me think through 
and hone this analysis. 
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